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The amount of information available to managers and the
amount of work required to sort the important from the
less important is increasing dramatically.
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Warnings are all about us that
the pace of change is accelerating. The amount of information
available to managers -- as well as the amount of work and judgment
required to sort the important from the less important -- is
increasing dramatically. The pervasive emergence of the Internet is
exacerbating these trends.
This is scary news -- because when the pace of change was slower,
most managers' track records in dealing with change weren't that
good. For example, none of the minicomputer companies such as
Digital, Data General, and Wang succeeded in developing a
competitive position in the personal computer business. Only one of
the hundreds of department stores, Dayton Hudson, now Target, became
a leader in discount retailing. Medical and business schools have
struggled to change their curricula fast enough to train the types
of doctors and managers that their markets need. The list could go
on. In most of these instances, seeing the innovations coming at
them hasn't been the problem. The organizations just didn't have the
capability to react to what their employees and leaders saw, in a
way that enabled them to keep pace with required changes.
When managers assign employees to tackle a critical innovation,
they instinctively work to match the requirements of the job with
the capabilities of the individuals they charge to do it. In
evaluating whether an employee is capable of successfully executing
a job, managers will look for the requisite knowledge, judgment,
skill, perspective, and energy. Managers will also assess the
employee's values -- the criteria by which the person tends to
decide what should and shouldn't be done.
Unfortunately, some managers don't think as rigorously about
whether their organizations have the capability to
successfully execute jobs that may be given to them. Often, they
assume that if the people working on a project individually have the
requisite capabilities to get the job done well, then the
organization in which they work will also have the same capability
to succeed.
This article offers a framework to help managers confronted with
necessary change understand whether the organizations over which
they preside are capable or incapable of tackling the challenge.
An Organizational Capabilities Framework
hree
classes of factors affect what an organization can and cannot do:
its resources, its processes, and its values. When asking what sorts
of innovations their organizations are and are not likely to be able
to implement successfully, managers can learn a lot about
capabilities by sorting their answers into these three categories.
Resources
Resources are the most visible of the factors that contribute to
what an organization can and cannot do. Resources include people,
equipment, technology, product designs, brands, information, cash,
and relationships with suppliers, distributors, and customers.
Resources are usually things, or assets -- they can be
hired and fired, bought and sold, depreciated or enhanced.
Resources are not only valuable, they are flexible. An
engineer who works productively for Dow Chemical can also work
productively in a start-up. Software that helps UPS manage its
logistics system can also be useful at Amazon.com. Technology that
proves valuable in mainframe computers also can be used in
telecommunications switches. Cash is a consummately flexible
resource.
Resources are the things that managers most instinctively
identify when assessing whether their organizations can successfully
implement changes that confront them. Yet resource analysis clearly
does not tell a sufficient story about capabilities.
Processes
Organizations create value as employees transform inputs of
resources into products and services of greater worth. The patterns
of interaction, coordination, communication, and decision making
through which they accomplish these transformations are processes.
Processes include not just manufacturing processes, but those by
which product development, procurement, market research, budgeting,
employee development and compensation, and resource allocation are
accomplished.
Processes are defined or evolve de facto to address specific
tasks. This means that when managers use a process to execute the
tasks for which it was designed, it is likely to perform
efficiently. But when the same seemingly efficient process is
employed to tackle a very different task, it is likely to prove
slow, bureaucratic, and inefficient. In contrast to the flexibility
of resources, processes are inherently inflexible. In other words, a
process that defines a capability in executing a certain task
concurrently defines disabilities in executing other tasks.
When managers employ processes designed to address one
problem to tackle different tasks, an organization
manifests slow, inefficient, and bureaucratic behavior.
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One of the dilemmas of management is that by their very nature,
processes are established so that employees perform recurrent tasks
in a consistent way, time after time. To ensure consistency,
processes are meant not to change -- or if they must change,
to change through tightly controlled procedures. The reason good
managers strive for focus in their organizations is that processes
and tasks can be readily aligned. The alignment of specific tasks
with the processes that were designed to address those tasks is, in
fact, the very definition of a focused organization. It is when
managers begin employing processes that were designed to address one
problem to tackle a range of very different tasks that an
organization manifests slow, inefficient, and bureaucratic behavior.
Values
The third class of factors that affects what an organization can or
cannot accomplish is its values. The term values carries an
ethical connotation, such as those that guide decisions to ensure
patient well-being at Johnson & Johnson or that guide decisions
about plant safety at Alcoa. But in this framework, values have a
broader meaning. An organization's values are the criteria by which
employees make decisions about priorities -- by which they judge
whether an order is attractive or unattractive, whether a customer
is more important or less important, whether an idea for a new
product is attractive or marginal, and so on. Employees at every
level make decisions about priorities. At the executive tiers, they
often take the form of decisions to invest or not invest in new
products, services, and processes. Among salespeople, they consist
of day -- to -- day decisions about which customers to call on and
which to ignore, which products to push and which to deemphasize.
The larger and more complex a company becomes, the more important
it is for senior managers to train employees at every level to make
independent decisions about priorities that are consistent with the
strategic direction and the business model of the company. A key
metric of good management, in fact, is whether such clear and
consistent values have permeated the organization.
Clear, consistent, and broadly understood values, however, also
define what an organization cannot do. A company's values must by
necessity reflect its cost structure or its business model, because
these define the rules its employees must follow for the company to
prosper. If, for example, the structure of a company's overhead
costs requires it to achieve gross profit margins of 40 percent, a
powerful value or decision rule will have evolved that encourages
middle managers to kill ideas that promise gross margins below 40
percent. This means that such an organization would be incapable
of successfully commercializing projects targeting low -- margin
markets -- even while another organization's values, driven by a
very different cost structure -- might enable or facilitate the
success of the very same project.
The values of successful firms tend to evolve in a predictable
fashion on at least two dimensions. The first relates to acceptable
gross margins. As companies add features and functionality to their
products and services in an effort to capture more attractive
customers in premium tiers of their markets, they often add overhead
cost. As a result, gross margins that at one point were quite
attractive at a later point seem unattractive. Their values change.
One of the bittersweet rewards of success is that as
companies become large, they lose the capability to
enter emerging markets.
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The second dimension along which values can change relates to how
big a customer or market has to be, in order to be interesting.
Because a company's stock price represents the discounted present
value of its projected earnings stream, most managers typically feel
compelled not just to maintain growth, but to maintain a constant
rate of growth. For a $40 million company to grow 25 percent, it
needs to find $10 million in new business the next year. For a $40
billion company to grow 25 percent, it needs to find $10
billion in new business the next year. The size of market
opportunity that will solve each of these companies' needs for
growth is very different. An opportunity that excites a small
organization isn't large enough to be interesting to a very large
one. One of the bittersweet rewards of success is, in fact, that as
companies become large, they literally lose the capability to enter
the small, emerging markets of today that will be tomorrow's large
markets. This disability is not because of a change in the resources
within the companies -- their resources typically are vast. Rather,
it is because their values change.
Those who engineer mega-mergers among already huge companies to
achieve cost savings, for example, need to account for the impact of
these actions on the resultant companies' values. Although their
merged research organizations might have more resources to throw at
innovation problems, they lose the appetite for all but the biggest
market opportunities. This constitutes a very real disability
in managing innovation.
The Capabilities to Address Sustaining or
Disruptive Technologies
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of the most important findings in the research summarized in
The Innovator's Dilemma relates to the differences in
companies' track records at making effective use of sustaining and
disruptive technologies. Sustaining technologies are
innovations that make a product or service better along the
dimensions of performance valued by customers in the mainstream
market. Compaq's early use of Intel's 32-bit 386 microprocessor
instead of the 16-bit 286 chip was an example of a sustaining
innovation. So was Merrill Lynch's introduction of its Cash
Management Account.
Disruptive innovations, on the other hand, bring to market
a new product or service that is actually worse along the
metrics of performance most valued by mainstream customers. Charles
Schwab's initial entry as a bare-bones discount broker was a
disruptive innovation, relative to the offerings of full-service
brokers. Early personal computers were a disruptive innovation,
relative to mainframes and minicomputers. PCs were disruptive in
that they didn't address the next-generation needs of leading
customers in existing markets. They had other attributes, of course,
that enabled new market applications to coalesce, however -- and
from those new applications, the disruptive innovations improved so
rapidly that they ultimately could address the needs of customers in
the mainstream market as well.
In a study of sustaining and disruptive technologies in the disk
drive industry, my colleagues and I built a database of every disk
drive model introduced by any company in the world between 1975 and
1995 -- comprising nearly 5,000 models. For each of these models, we
gathered data on the components used, as well as the software codes
and architectural concepts employed. This allowed us to put our
finger right on the spot in the industry where each new technology
was used. We could then correlate companies' leadership or
laggardship in using new technologies with their subsequent fortunes
in the market.
We identified 116 new technologies that were introduced in the
industry's history. Of these, 111 were sustaining technologies, in
that their impact was to improve the performance of disk drives.
Some of these were incremental improvements while others, such as
magneto -- resistive heads, represented discontinuous leaps forward
in performance. In all 111 cases of sustaining technology, the
companies that led in developing and introducing the new technology
were the companies that had led in the old technology. It didn't
matter how difficult it was, from a technological point of view. The
success rate of the established firms was 100 percent.
The other five technologies were disruptive innovations -- in
each case, smaller disk drives that were slower and had lower
capacity than those used in the mainstream market. There was no new
technology involved in these disruptive products. Yet none of
the industry's leading companies remained atop the industry after
these disruptive innovations entered the market -- their batting
average was zero. The Innovator's Dilemma recounts how
dynamics like those we observed for disk drives -- the interplay
between the speed of technology change and the evolution in market
needs -- precipitated the failure of the leading companies to cope
with disruptive innovations in a range of very different industries.
Why such markedly different batting averages when playing the
sustaining versus disruptive games? The answer lies in the
resources-processes-values (RPV) framework of organizational
capabilities described earlier. The industry leaders developed and
introduced sustaining technologies over and over again. Month after
month, year after year, as they introduced improved products to gain
a competitive edge, the leading companies developed processes for
evaluating the technological potential and assessing their
customers' needs for alternative sustaining technologies. In the
parlance of this article, the organizations developed a
capability for doing these things, which resided in their
processes. Sustaining technology investments also fit the values of
the leading companies, in that they promised higher margins from
better products sold to their leading -- edge customers.
On the other hand, the disruptive innovations occurred so
intermittently that no company had a routinized process for handling
them. Furthermore, because the disruptive products promised lower
profit margins per unit sold and could not be used by their best
customers, these innovations were inconsistent with the leading
companies' values. The leading disk drive companies had the
resources -- the people, money, and technology -- required to
succeed at both sustaining and disruptive technologies. But their
processes and values constituted disabilities in their efforts to
succeed at disruptive technologies.
Large companies often surrender emerging growth markets because
smaller, disruptive companies are actually more capable of pursuing
them. Though start-ups lack resources, it doesn't matter. Their
values can embrace small markets, and their cost structures can
accommodate lower margins. Their market research and resource
allocation processes allow managers to proceed intuitively rather
than having to be backed up by careful research and analysis. All
these advantages add up to enormous opportunity or looming disaster
-- depending on your perspective.
Managers who face the need to change or innovate, therefore, need to
do more than assign the right resources to the problem. They need to
be sure that the organization in which those resources will be
working is itself capable of succeeding -- and in making that
assessment, managers must scrutinize whether the organization's
processes and values fit the problem.
Creating Capabilities to Cope with Change
manager who determined that an employee was incapable of succeeding
at a task would either find someone else to do the job or carefully
train the employee to be able to succeed. Training often works,
because individuals can become skilled at multiple tasks.
Processes are not as flexible as resources -- and values
are even less so.
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Despite beliefs spawned by change-management and reengineering
programs, processes are not nearly as flexible as resources are --
and values are even less so. The processes that make an organization
good at outsourcing components cannot simultaneously make it good at
developing and manufacturing components in-house. Values that focus
an organization's priorities on large customers cannot
simultaneously focus priorities on small customers. For these
reasons, managers who determine that an organization's capabilities
aren't suited for a new task are faced with three options through
which to create new capabilities:
- Acquire a different organization whose processes and values
are a close match with the new task.
- Try to change the processes and values of the current
organization.
- Separate out an independent organization and develop within
it the new processes and values required to solve the new
problem.
Creating Capabilities Through Acquisitions
Unfortunately, companies' track records in developing
new capabilities through acquisition are frighteningly
spotty.
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Managers often sense that acquiring rather than developing a set of
capabilities makes competitive and financial sense. Unfortunately,
companies' track records in developing new capabilities through
acquisition are frighteningly spotty. Here, the RPV framework can be
a useful way to frame the challenge of integrating acquired
organizations. Acquiring managers need to begin by asking, "What is
it that really created the value I just paid so dearly for? Did I
justify the price because of the acquisition's resources -- its
people, products, technology, market position, and so on? Or was a
substantial portion of its worth created by processes and values --
unique ways of working and decision making that have enabled the
company to understand and satisfy customers and develop, make, and
deliver new products and services in a timely way?"
If the acquired company's processes and values are the real
driver of its success, then the last thing the acquiring manager
wants to do is to integrate the company into the new parent
organization. Integration will vaporize many of the processes and
values of the acquired firm as its managers are required to adopt
the buyer's way of doing business and have their proposals to
innovate evaluated according to the decision criteria of the
acquiring company. If the acquiree's processes and values were the
reason for its historical success, a better strategy is to let the
business stand alone, and for the parent to infuse its resources
into the acquired firm's processes and values. This strategy, in
essence, truly constitutes the acquisition of new capabilities.
If, on the other hand, the company's resources were the
primary rationale for the acquisition, then integrating the firm
into the parent can make a lot of sense -- essentially plugging the
acquired people, products, technology, and customers into the
parent's processes as a way of leveraging the parent's existing
capabilities.
The perils of the ongoing DaimlerChrysler merger, for example,
can be better understood through the RPV model. Chrysler had few
resources that could be considered unique in comparison to its
competitors. Its recent success in the market was rooted in its
processes -- particularly in its product design process and in its
processes of managing its relationships with its key subsystem
suppliers. What is the best way for Daimler to leverage the
capabilities that Chrysler brings to the table? Wall Street is
pressuring management to consolidate the two organizations so as to
cut costs. However, if the two companies are integrated, it is very
likely that the key processes that made Chrysler such an attractive
acquisition will not just be compromised. They will be vaporized.
This situation is reminiscent of IBM's 1984 acquisition of Rolm.
There wasn't anything in Rolm's pool of resources that IBM didn't
already have. It was Rolm's processes for developing PBX products
and for finding new markets for them that was really responsible for
its success. In 1987 IBM decided to fully integrate the company into
its corporate structure. IBM soon learned the folly of this
decision. Trying to push Rolm's resources -- its products and its
customers -- through the same processes that were honed in IBM's
large-computer business caused the Rolm business to stumble badly.
This decision to integrate Rolm actually destroyed the very source
of the original worth of the deal. How much better off they would
have been had IBM infused some of its vast resources into Rolm's
processes and values!
Financial analysts have a better intuition for the worth
of resources than for processes or values.
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DaimlerChrysler, bowing to the investment community's drumbeat
for efficiency savings, now stands on the edge of the same
precipice. Often, it seems, financial analysts have a better
intuition for the worth of resources than for processes or values.
In contrast, Cisco Systems' acquisitions process has worked well
-- because, I would argue, it has kept resources, processes, and
values in the right perspective. Between 1993 and 1997 most of its
acquisitions were small companies that were less than two years old:
early-stage organizations whose market value was built primarily on
resources -- particularly engineers and products. Cisco has a
well-defined, deliberate process by which it essentially plugs these
resources into the parent's processes and systems, and it has a
carefully cultivated method of keeping the engineers of the acquired
company happily on the Cisco payroll. In the process of integration,
Cisco throws away whatever nascent processes and values came with
the acquisition -- because those weren't what Cisco paid for. On a
couple of occasions when the company acquired a larger, more mature
organization -- notably its 1996 acquisition of StrataCom -- Cisco
did not integrate. Rather, it let StrataCom stand alone, and
infused its substantial resources into the organization to help it
grow at a more rapid rate.
Creating New Capabilities Internally
Too often, resources are plugged into fundamentally
unchanged processes -- and little change results.
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Companies that have tried to develop new capabilities within
established organizational units also have a spotty track record.
Assembling a beefed-up set of resources as a means of changing what
an existing organization can do is relatively straightforward.
People with new skills can be hired, technology can be licensed,
capital can be raised, and product lines, brands, and information
can be acquired. Too often, however, resources such as these are
then plugged into fundamentally unchanged processes -- and little
change results. For example, through the 1970s and 1980s Toyota up
-- ended the world automobile industry through its innovation in
development, manufacturing, and supply-chain processes --
without investing aggressively in resources such as advanced
manufacturing or information processing technology. General Motors
responded by investing nearly $60 billion in manufacturing
resources -- computer-automated equipment that was designed to
reduce cost and improve quality. Using state-of-the-art resources in
antiquated processes, however, made little difference in GM's
performance, because it is in its processes and values that the
organization's most fundamental capabilities lie. Processes and
values define how resources -- many of which can be bought and sold,
hired and fired -- are combined to create value.
Unfortunately, processes are very hard to change. Organizational
boundaries are often drawn to facilitate the operation of present
processes. Those boundaries can impede the creation of new processes
that cut across those boundaries. When new challenges require people
or groups to interact differently than they habitually have done --
addressing different challenges with different timing than
historically required -- managers need to pull the relevant people
out of the existing organization and draw a new boundary around a
new group. New team boundaries enable or facilitate new patterns of
working together that ultimately can coalesce as new processes --
new capabilities for transforming inputs into outputs. In their book
Revolutionizing Product Development, Steven C. Wheelwright
and Kim B. Clark call these structures heavyweight teams. Not
just Chrysler but companies as diverse as Medtronic in cardiac
pacemakers, IBM in disk drives, and Eli Lilly with its new
blockbuster drug Zyprexa have used heavyweight teams as vehicles
within which new processes could coalesce.
Creating Capabilities Through a Spin-Out Organization
The third mechanism for creating new capabilities -- spawning them
within spin-out ventures -- is currently in vogue among many
managers as they wrestle with how to address the Internet. When are
spin-outs a crucial step in building new capabilities to exploit
change, and what are the guidelines by which they should be managed?
A separate organization is required when the mainstream
organization's values would render it incapable of focusing
resources on the innovation project. Large organizations cannot be
expected to freely allocate the critical financial and human
resources needed to build a strong position in small, emerging
markets. And it is very difficult for a company whose cost structure
is tailored to compete in high-end markets to be profitable in
low-end markets as well. When a threatening disruptive technology
requires a different cost structure to be profitable and
competitive, or when the current size of the opportunity is
insignificant relative to the growth needs of the mainstream
organization, then -- and only then -- is a spin -- out organization
a required part of the solution.
Just as with new processes, business based on new values needs to
be established while the old business is still at the top of its
game. Merrill Lynch's retail brokerage business, for example, is
today a very healthy business -- and the firm's processes and values
for serving its clients work well. The disruption of on-line
brokerage looms powerfully on the horizon -- but any attempt Merrill
management might make to transform the existing business to succeed
in the next world of self-service, automated trading would
compromise its near-term profit potential. Merrill Lynch needs to
own another retail brokerage business, which would be free to create
its own processes and forge a cost structure that could enable
different values to prevail. It must do this if it hopes to thrive
in the post-disruption world.
How separate does the effort need to be? The primary requirement
is that the project cannot be forced to compete with projects in the
mainstream organization for resources. Because values are the
criteria by which decisions about priorities are made, projects that
are inconsistent with a company's mainstream values will naturally
be accorded lowest priority. The physical location of the
independent organization is less important than is its independence
from the normal resource allocation process.
In our studies of this challenge, we have never seen a company
succeed in addressing a change that disrupts its mainstream values
absent the personal, attentive oversight of the CEO -- precisely
because of the power of processes and values and particularly the
logic of the normal resource allocation process. Only the CEO can
ensure that the new organization gets the required resources and is
free to create processes and values that are appropriate to the new
challenge. CEOs who view spin -- outs as a tool to get disruptive
threats off their personal agendas are almost certain to meet with
failure. We have seen no exceptions to this rule.
A Structural Framework for Managing Different
Types of Innovation
he
framework summarized in the figure can help
managers exploit current organizational capabilities when that is
possible, and to create new ones when the present organization is
incapable. The left axis in the figure measures the extent to which
the existing processes -- the patterns of interaction,
communication, coordination, and decision making currently used in
the organization -- are the ones that will get the new job done
effectively. If the answer is yes (toward the lower end of the
scale), the new team can exploit the organization's existing
processes or capabilities to succeed. As depicted in the
corresponding position on the right axis, functional or lightweight
teams are useful structures for exploiting existing capabilities. On
the other hand, if the ways of getting work done and of decision
making in the mainstream business would impede rather than
facilitate the work of the new team -- because different people need
to interact with different people about different subjects and with
different timing than has habitually been necessary -- then a
heavyweight team structure is necessary. Heavyweight teams are tools
to create new processes -- new ways of working together that
constitute new capabilities.
FITTING AN
INNOVATION'S REQUIREMENTS
WITH THE ORGANIZATION'S CAPABILITIES
Note: The left and bottom axes reflect the
questions the manager needs to ask about the existing
situation. The italicized notes at the right side
represent the appropriate response to the situation on
the left axis. The italicized notes at the top represent
the appropriate response to the manager's answer to the
situation on the bottom axis.
Return to reference |
The horizontal axis of the figure asks managers to assess whether
the organization's values will allocate to the new initiative the
resources it will need in order to become successful. If there is a
poor or disruptive fit, then the mainstream organization's values
will accord low priority to the project. Therefore, setting up an
autonomous organization within which development and
commercialization can occur will be absolutely essential to success.
At the other extreme, however, if there is a strong, sustaining fit,
then the manager can expect that the energy and resources of the
mainstream organization will coalesce behind it. There is no reason
for a skunk works or a spin-out in such cases.
Region "A" in the figure depicts a situation in which a manager
is faced with a sustaining technological change -- it fits the
organization's values. But it presents the organization with
different types of problems to solve and therefore requires new
types of interaction and coordination among groups and individuals.
The manager needs a heavyweight development team to tackle the new
task, but the project can be executed within the mainstream company.
This is how Chrysler, Eli Lilly, Medtronic, and the IBM disk drive
division successfully revamped their product development processes.
When in region "B" (where the project fits the company's processes
and values), a lightweight development team, in which coordination
across functional boundaries occurs within the mainstream
organization, can be successful. Region "C" denotes an area in which
a manager is faced with a disruptive technological change that
doesn't fit the organization's existing processes and values. To
ensure success in such instances, managers should create an
autonomous organization and commission a heavyweight development
team to tackle the challenge.
Functional and lightweight teams are appropriate vehicles for
exploiting established capabilities, whereas heavyweight teams are
tools for creating new ones. Spin-out organizations, similarly, are
tools for forging new values. Unfortunately, most companies employ a
one-size-fits-all organizing strategy, using lightweight teams for
programs of every size and character. Among those few firms that
have accepted the "heavyweight gospel," many have attempted to
organize all development teams in a heavyweight fashion. Ideally,
each company should tailor the team structure and organizational
location to the process and values required by each project.
The Danger of Wishful Thinking
The capabilities of an organization also define its
disabilities.
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Managers whose organizations
are confronting change must first determine that they have the
resources required to succeed. They then need to ask a separate
question: Does the organization have the processes and values to
succeed? Asking this second question is not as instinctive for most
managers because the processes by which work is done and the values
by which employees make their decisions have served them well. What
the RPV framework adds to managers' thinking, however, is the
concept that the very capabilities of an organization also define
its disabilities. A little time spent soul-searching for honest
answers to this issue will pay off handsomely. Are the processes by
which work habitually gets done in the organization appropriate for
this new problem? And will the values of the organization cause this
initiative to get high priority, or to languish?
If the answer to these questions is no, it's okay. Understanding
problems is the most crucial step in solving them. Wishful thinking
about this issue can set teams charged with developing and
implementing an innovation on a course fraught with roadblocks,
second-guessing, and frustration. The reasons why innovation often
seems to be so difficult for established firms is that they employ
highly capable people and then set them to work within processes and
values that weren't designed to facilitate success with the task at
hand. Ensuring that capable people are ensconced in capable
organizations is a major management responsibility in an age such as
ours, when the ability to cope with accelerating change has become
so critical..
Copyright © 2001 by
Clayton M. Christensen. Reprinted with permission from
Leader to Leader, a publication of the Leader to Leader
Institute and Jossey-Bass.
Print citation:
Christensen, Clayton M. "Assessing Your Organization's
Innovation Capabilities" Leader to Leader. 21 (Summer
2001): 27-37.
This article is available
on the Leader to Leader Institute Web site, http://leadertoleader.org/leaderbooks/L2L/summer2001/christensen.html. |
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